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A SURVEY AND SOME COMMENTARY ON FEDERAL 
“TORT REFORM” 
Michael P. Allen* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
For at least several decades now there has been a sustained attempt 
to “reform” the American tort system.1  Simplifying matters somewhat, 
the central argument of current tort-reformers is that the American civil 
justice system is out of control and unfair to all involved, particularly 
defendants.  These advocates contend that the system is rife with 
frivolous lawsuits, unethical behavior by plaintiffs’ attorneys, and 
runaway juries.2  In order to combat these perceived ills, today’s tort 
reform proponents champion a wide array of changes to the civil justice 
system.  These changes range from alterations in substantive tort law, to 
the imposition of damages caps, to restrictions on attorneys’ fees.3 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law; B.A. 1989 University of 
Rochester, J.D. 1992 Columbia University School of Law.  This paper was prepared for the Fourth 
Remedies Discussion Forum held at the Louis D. Brandeis School of Law at the University of 
Louisville.  I thank the participants in this forum for their helpful comments and suggestions.  
Thanks also to the members of the Stetson Faculty Support Office for their help.  Finally, I express 
my gratitude to the staff of the Akron Law Review for excellent work. 
 1. For example, the American Tort Reform Association (“ATRA”), founded in 1986, 
proclaims that it is “dedicated to reforming the civil justice system.”  See AMERICAN TORT REFORM 
ASSOCIATION, ATRA:: ABOUT ATRA (2006), http://www.atra.org/about/.  Of course, efforts to 
“reform” the tort system have been around for many years.  See, e.g., Perry H. Apelbaum & Samara 
T. Ryder, The Third Wave of Federal Tort Reform: Protecting the Public or Pushing the 
Constitutional Envelope?, 8 CORNELL J. L & PUB. POL’Y 591 (1999) (surveying federal tort reform 
activity from 1906 to 1999); Rachel M. Janutis, The Struggle Over Tort Reform and the Overlooked 
Legacy of the Progressives and Populists, 39 AKRON L. REV. 943 (2006) (analyzing strands of tort 
reform in the progressive and populist movements in Ohio). 
 2. See generally AMERICAN TORT REFORM ASSOCIATION, ATRA:: ABOUT ATRA (2006), 
http://www.atra.org/about/ (cataloging perceived problems in the American civil litigation system). 
 3. See generally AMERICAN TORT REFORM ASSOCIATION, ATRA:: STATE AND FEDERAL 
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORMS, http://www.atra.org/reforms/ (summarizing tort reforms in the United 
States). 
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The tort reformers have primarily focused on the states.4  For many 
reasons, that focus makes sense, particularly in historical perspective.  
To begin with, the national government was not as politically receptive 
two decades ago as it is today to tort reform efforts.  Moreover, it was 
and remains true that “tort” issues are generically thought of as local 
matters.  Thus, the states have provided the most prominent battlefield 
on which the tort reform wars have been fought.  And there is no doubt 
that further battles in this tort reform war will occur in the states in the 
future. 
Despite the importance of the states, they have not provided the 
only stage upon which the debate has been waged.  There have also been 
significant efforts made to implement tort reform on the national level, 
both legislatively and judicially.  This paper considers those reform 
efforts at the national level.  I have two principal (and relatively modest) 
goals.  First, I hope to provide a survey and summary of the major types 
of tort reform possible at the federal level.  Second, in addition to that 
fundamentally descriptive effort, I provide commentary concerning open 
questions about the various types of reforms, the rationales for pursuing 
one type of reform over another, and how the actions of one branch of 
government can have an impact on the efforts of others.  I largely leave 
for another day questions concerning what types of “reform,” if any, 
should be pursued at the federal level. 
Before continuing, a definitional detour is in order.  There is no 
denying that “tort reform” is in many respects a loaded term these days.  
If one advocates “tort reform,” she is taken to be arguing that the current 
system is, all things considered, unfair to defendants.  In other words, 
arguments about tort reform are really arguments about restricting tort 
recoveries in one form or another.5  In short, tort reform is seen by those 
who oppose current efforts as a “conservative” issue used by business 
interests and the insurance industry to undermine the chances for and 
amount of recovery by victims of wrongdoing.6 
 
 4. For example, while discussing federal tort reform efforts as well, the overwhelming focus 
of the ATRA has been on legislative and judicial business in the states.  See id. 
 5. See AMERICAN TORT REFORM ASSOCIATION, ATRA :: ABOUT ATRA (2006), 
http://www.atra.org/about/ (describing the perceived abuses in the current American tort system and 
arguing that the current litigation climate is “bad for business” and “bad for society.”). 
 6. For example, one prominent critic of current “tort reform” describes matters as follows: 
Let us start by understanding what tort reform is.  Tort reform, or as I like to call it, tort 
restrictionism, is nothing more than the use of outsized political clout to skew the legal system in 
favor of the powerful.  The advantages that businesses obtain in the political system are enlisted to 
obtain similar advantages in the courtroom.  At its most basic and essential level, the tort 
restrictionist agenda represents dissatisfaction with the legal system, most particularly 
2
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Yet, it need not be the case that calls for “tort reform” only refer to 
restricting recoveries and making the process more difficult for 
plaintiffs.  Arguments for increasing recoveries and making the system 
easier for plaintiffs are just as much about reforming the civil justice 
system in this country.  I realize that disputes about the meaning of the 
term “tort reform” are largely academic now; there is little chance that 
the politically-charged nature of the term will change anytime soon.  But 
for purposes of this paper, when I use the term “tort reform” I am not 
restricting innovations to those designed to make recovery more 
difficult.  Instead, I use the term in the broadest sense possible to include 
all efforts to have an effect on the tort system, whether such effects are 
plaintiff-friendly, defendant-friendly, or of an indeterminate nature. 
This Essay proceeds as follows.  In Part I, I survey the potential 
types of federal tort reform.  While many of these types of reform 
measures could be adopted at the state level as well as nationally, some 
important ones could not.  It is on those uniquely federal measures that I 
focus much of my attention.  This section also considers the 
interrelationships of the branches of government as well as the political 
and legal advantages and disadvantages of various types of reform.  In 
Part II, I discuss some of the legislation adopted in the wake of the 
September 11th terrorist attacks.  That legislation provides a useful 
summary of what can be done at the federal level by combining the 
various avenues for reform available to the national government.  It also 
gives one a good indication of the extent, and simultaneously, the 
subtlety of federal power in the American constitutional order. 
II.  A SURVEY (WITH SOME COMMENTARY) OF FEDERAL TORT REFORM 
Federal tort reform is quite varied both in terms of the nature of 
reform and the agent of change.  In terms of agency, tort reform comes 
from both the political branches of government (i.e., Congress and the 
Executive) as well as the judiciary.  It is not particularly useful, 
however, to categorize the tort reform efforts simply by the branch 
engaging in the activity as an initial matter.  The fact is that many of 
these efforts are the result of an iterative process in which Congress or 
the courts react to a reform measure implemented by another branch.  In 
 
dissatisfaction with judges and juries. . . . Although it may be dressed up in the rhetoric of non-
existent litigation explosions, insurance crises, horrifying economic consequences, unconscionable 
jury awards, and frivolous lawsuits, tort restrictionist laws are little more than relief to the habitually 
negligent and the intentionally reckless. Robert S. Peck, In Defense of Fundamental Principles: The 
Unconstitutionality of Tort Reform, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 672, 673-74 (2001) (footnotes omitted). 
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this way, the reform efforts can mutate, often in ways that seem startling 
given the genesis of a particular reform proposal. 
I have grouped federal tort reform efforts into four broad categories 
that are roughly tied to the nature of the federal activity: (A) substantive 
legislation, including the regulation of the standards of liability as well 
as the amount of damages recoverable; (B) judicial decisions 
interpreting the Constitution, federal statutes (including a discussion of 
preemption), and federal common law; (C) lawmaking focused on 
procedural rules; and (D) control of federal court jurisdiction and related 
doctrines.  I discuss each of these issues separately below. 
While I do not purport to provide an exhaustive description of all 
the issues implicated by each type of reform, I hope to set forth a 
meaningful discussion of the use (or misuse depending on one’s point of 
view) of a particular federal tort reform device.  Along the way, I also 
consider other matters such as the utility of a given reform measure as 
well as open questions – both of a constitutional and policy/political 
nature – concerning certain reform efforts. 
A.  Substantive Legislation 
The first and probably most commonly considered type of tort 
reform is legislation directly addressing either tort liability or damages, 
what I refer to as “substantive” legislation.7  Such legislative action is a 
major focus of efforts in the states.8  But it is also a significant form of 
actual and/or potential reforms on the federal level.  Indeed, substantive 
legislation formed an important part of the Republican party’s “Contract 
with America” in the mid-1990s.9  And it remains on the legislative 
agenda in Congress today.10 
 
 7. For example, ATRA publishes a “Tort Reform Record” twice a year reporting on 
legislative and judicial developments in the area on a state-by-state basis.  See AMERICAN TORT 
REFORM ASSOCIATION, TORT REFORM RECORD (JULY 22, 2005),   
http://www.atra.org/files.cgi/7927_Record7-05.pdf. The clear majority of the developments 
discussed in these Records are “substantive” in the sense I use the term.  See id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Paragraph 9 of the Contract with America called for the enactment of the Common Sense 
Legal Reform Act dealing with reforms involving product liability litigation, punitive damages, and 
payment of attorneys’ fees, among other things.  See REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, 
REPUBLICAN CONTRACT WITH AMERICA, REPUBLICAN CONTRACT WITH AMERICAN (Sep. 27, 
1994), www.house.gov/house/contract/CONTRACT.html. 
 10. See, e.g., Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act of 2005, H.R. 554, 109th 
Cong. (concerning lawsuits against fast food chains related to obesity in the American Population); 
Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. No. 109-92, 199 Stat. 2095 (Oct. 26, 2005) 
(concerning liability of firearm manufacturers for certain claims); The Fairness in Asbestos Injury 
Resolution Act of 2005, S.852, 109th Cong. (concerning creation of claims handling procedures for 
4
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An obvious advantage of such substantive legislation wherever 
implemented is that it directly addresses a perceived failing in the tort 
system.  Thus, if one is concerned about the magnitude of damages for 
“non-economic losses,” a cap on such damages will directly affect the 
issue.11  Similarly, if one is concerned about liability being imposed on 
product manufacturers in circumstances not warranting the imposition of 
damages, legislation establishing defenses to such liability would seem 
to be a fairly direct means by which to address the issue.12  However, 
 
asbestos claims); Medical Malpractice Insurance Corporation Act, H.R. 3865, 109th Cong. 
(concerning “frivolous” medical malpractice claims). While substantive tort reform has certainly 
been a prominent component of the federal government of late, the national government has long 
been a player in substantive efforts to address perceived problems in the American tort system.  See 
Apelbaum & Ryder, supra note 1 (surveying federal tort reform activity from 1906 to 1999). 
 11. Legislation capping non-economic damages has been quite common at the state level.  
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (2006) (cap of $250,000 for non-economic damages in medical 
malpractice actions); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.118 (2005) (cap of $500,000 for non-economic 
damages in medical malpractice actions); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-1902, 60-1903 (2005) (cap of 
$250,000 for non-economic damages in wrongful death actions); MD. CODE ANN. § 11-108 (2006) 
(cap of $500,000 for non-economic damages in all actions); see also AMERICAN TORT REFORM 
ASSOCIATION, NONECONOMIC DAMAGES REFORM (2006), http://www.atra.org/issues//index.php? 
issue=7340 (collecting state-by-state legislative activity concerning damages caps).  It has also been 
proposed, although not enacted, at the federal level.  See, e.g., Patients First Act of 2003, S. 11, 
108th Cong. (2003) (proposed cap of $250,000 on non-economic damages in medical malpractice 
actions).  While a cap will certainly have a direct effect on the amount of damages awarded for non-
economic loses, the manner in which it will affect those damages, as well as other damages in a 
given case, is by no means clear.  See e.g. Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: 
Women, Children and the Elderly, 53 EMORY L. J. 1263 (2004) (describing the uncertain impact of 
damages caps on certain vulnerable groups); Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of 
Medical Malpractice Damages Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391 (2005) (presenting empirical study 
concerning the impact on certain types of damages caps on overall damages awarded in medical 
malpractice cases); Kathryn Zeiler, Turning from Damages Caps to Information Disclosure: An 
Alternative to Tort Reform, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 385 (2005) (arguing that 
statutory caps on medical malpractice recoveries are not an effective means to address health 
insurance issues). 
 12. Many states have enacted reforms in this area.  See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-20-5-1 
(2005) (providing a rebuttable presumption that a product is not defective if it conformed to the 
“state of the art” or complied with certain government standards); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:2800.54 
(2005) (providing that a product may be deemed “unreasonably dangerous” only if one of four 
conditions are met); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4 (2005) (providing that a manufacturer is not liable 
for a warning defect claim if it follows certain statutory requirement); see also TORT REFORM 
ASSOCIATION, PRODUCT LIABILITY REFORM (2006), http://www.atra.org/issues/index.php?issue= 
7341 (collecting state product liability reforms).  While there have been targeted actions on the 
federal level concerning substantive product liability issues, (see, e.g., Swine Flu Act of 1976, 42 
U.S.C. § 247B (2000) (substituting the United States as defendant in cases that could be brought 
against the manufacturers of the Swine Flu vaccine); Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 
Pub. L. No. 109-92, 199 Stat. 2095 (Oct. 25, 2005) (restricting liability of gun manufactures in 
certain situations) no broad based reform measures in this area have become law.  There have, 
however, been attempts at such comprehensive federal action in this area.  See, e.g., Product 
Liability Reform Act, S. 648, 105th Cong. (1997). 
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this direct relationship between perceived problem and proposed cure is 
also a potential drawback of such reform efforts.  Because the goal of 
reform is so easily seen, and so easily communicated to the public, these 
types of reform efforts appear more likely to draw vocal opposition 
beyond representatives of core interest groups than many of the other 
reform avenues I discuss.13 
Substantive legislative federal tort reform has been widely debated 
in the academic literature over the years.14  I do not intend to rehearse 
that debate.  Instead, my brief comments will focus on the difficulties 
most often associated with substantive tort reform on the federal level 
and some of the advantages of this type of activity when properly 
pursued. 
Achieving substantive legislative tort reform on the federal level 
tends to suffer from two major potential difficulties: one constitutional 
and the other political.  In terms of the Constitution, there are challenges 
involving both individual rights and governmental structure.  I discuss 
individual rights issues below in connection with the judiciary’s role in 
tort reform.15  On the structural level, the debate concerns whether the 
federal government has the requisite constitutional authority to act to 
address perceived defects in the tort system.  It is a truism that the 
federal government in the United States is one of limited powers.16  
Whatever else that truism means, at a minimum there is a requirement to 
locate in the Constitution some clause to which one can cite to support 
Congressional action.17 
 
 13. Others have also made this suggestion.  See, e.g., Eric J. Segall, Article III as a Grant of 
Power: Protective Jurisdiction, Federalism and the Federal Courts, 54 FLA. L. REV. 361, 391-92 
(2002) (discussing the different political implications associated with enacting substantive 
legislation as opposed to jurisdictional provisions alone). 
 14. See, e.g., Apelbaum & Ryder, supra note 1; William Powers, Jr., Some Pitfalls of Federal 
Tort Reform Legislation, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 909 (1996); Symposium: Is H.R. 956 Really “Common 
Sense”?: A Symposium on Federal Tort Reform Legislation, 64 TENN. L. REV. 557-937 (1997); 
Symposium, The Federalization of State Law, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 715-824 (1995). 
 15. See infra Part I.B.1.  The implication of constitutional rights on tort reform measures is an 
example of how the action of one branch can have an impact on the actions of another. 
 16. For example, Justice O’Connor has explained: 
If a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly 
disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a power is an attribute of state 
sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution 
has not conferred on Congress. . . . It is in this sense that the Tenth Amendment states 
but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered. 
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 17. Once such a particular constitutional provision is located, the Necessary and Proper 
Clause provides a powerful means of implementing federal power.  That Clause provides that “[t]he 
6
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The Interstate Commerce Clause18 and Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment are those parts of the Constitution must likely to provide 
authorization for tort reform.19  The problem with tort reform based on 
either of these grounds is that the precise scope of Congressional 
authority under them is uncertain.20  This Essay is not the place to 
 
Congress shall have Power . . . To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for the 
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in 
the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 18.  The Court has long interpreted this Clause to give Congress broad power so long as its 
actions are rationally related to advancing an enumerated federal power.  See, e.g., Gonzalez v. 
Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005); M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 18. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Congress shall have Power . . . “To regulate Commerce . . . 
among the several states  . . .”).  Other commentators have explored the Commerce Clause basis for 
federal tort reform in detail.  See, e.g., Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and Federalism: Whatever 
Happened to Devolution?, YALE L. & POL’Y REV  429, 438-42 (1996); Apelbaum & Ryder, supra 
note 1 at 635-39; William P. Marshall, Federalization: A Critical Overview, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 
719 (1995); Jerry J. Phillips, Hoist by One’s Own Petard: When a Conservative Commerce Clause 
Interpretation Meets Conservative Tort Reform, 64 TENN. L. REV. 647 (1997); Victor E. Schwartz 
& Mark A. Behrens, Federal Product Liability Reform in 1997: History and Public Policy Support 
Its Enactment Now, 64 TENN. L. REV. 595, 604-07 (1997). 
 19. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article.”); see also Ackerman, supra note 18, at 433-38 (same); 
Apelbaum & Ryder, supra note 1, at 639-43 (discussing Section 5 as basis for tort reform 
measures). 
 20. Until 1995, there appeared to be few limits on Congress’s power to legislate under the 
Commerce Clause.  See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 18, at 446 (concluding in 1995 that “[a]s 
recently as one year ago, we might have confidently stated that the commerce power is broad 
enough to encompass virtually any tort legislation Congress might enact”).  However, this certainty 
changed when the Court decided U.S. v. Lopez in 1995.  514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down the 
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 exceeding Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause).  
The uncertainty only grew when the Court struck down another law as exceeding congressional 
power over interstate commerce.  See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking 
down Federal Access to Clinic Entrance Act).  After Lopez and Morrison, there was a sense that 
Commerce Clause doctrine was in some state of disarray.  See, e.g., JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. 
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 190-94 (7th ed. 2004) (discussing uncertainly about the 
Rehnquist Court’s Commerce Clause cases); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW, VOL. I 817-24 (3d ed. 2000) (same, although written before Morrison was decided).  That 
debate will certainly intensify after the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Gonzalez v. Raich, 125 
S. Ct. 2195 (2005).  In Raich, the Court upheld prosecution under the federal Controlled Substances 
Act of individuals distributing and possessing marijuana grown using entirely intrastate resources 
for use only by residents of the state in question.  Id.  What Raich means for the Lopez/Morrison 
doctrine is not yet clear, and will probably not be so for many years to come.  See, e.g., Symposium:  
Federalism after Gonzales v. Raich, 9 LEWIS AND CLARK L. REV. 743-934 (2005).    
Correspondingly, the line between authorized and unauthorized Congressional lawmaking remains 
blurred, with a consequent uncertainty injected into the use of the commerce power to justify federal 
tort reform. 
  The same type of uncertainty exists under Section 5.  At times the Court has read this 
provision in such a way as to significantly restrict Congressional lawmaking ability.  See, e.g., City 
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (requiring congruence and proportionality between the 
problem Congress identified and the actions it has taken to enforce the Amendment’s guarantees).  
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explore the contours of the Commerce Clause or Section 5.  My point is 
that the need to locate a specific source of Congressional authority 
serves as a check on the efficacy of federal substantive legislative tort 
reform, a check that does not exist at the state level. 
Another  constitutional structure issue, focused less on text and 
more on overarching constitutional values, further affects the ability to 
successfully employ tort reform at the federal level.  Even if one could 
support federal action by reference to the Commerce Clause or some 
other constitutional provision, the argument is that the Constitution 
embodies a preference for state action in traditionally state-regulated 
areas.21  Thus, the argument continues, federal tort reform efforts are 
generally suspect on such a “federalism” principle.22  Such arguments 
are misplaced and should not dissuade proponents of federal substantive 
legislative action.  As a matter of constitutional interpretation, it seems a 
far better approach to avoid grafting unwritten limits onto express grants 
of Congressional power.  Instead, grants of power should be seen as 
embodying a decision of the Framers concerning the proper “intrusion” 
of federal authority on that of the states.  It is true that the Court has 
recently imposed certain federalism-based limitations on Congressional 
power, but these restrictions have come in the narrow area of federal 
authority directly over the states as states.23  The Court has shown little 
willingness to restrict Congressional authority once a Commerce Clause 
(or other) basis has been established outside of this narrow area.  Thus, I 
 
Yet, some recent cases perhaps suggest a weakening of this hostility to Congressional power.  See, 
e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (upholding Congressional power to abrogate state 
sovereign immunity under Title II of the Americans with Disability Act with respect to access to 
courts).  As with the Commerce Clause, only time will tell where the precise boundaries of 
Congressional power lie. 
 21. Other commentators have also discussed this basic concept in one form or another.  See, 
e.g., Apelbaum & Ryder, supra note 1, at 653-57; Harvey S. Perlman, Products Liability Reform in 
Congress: An Issue of Federalism, 48 OHIO ST. L. J. 503, 507-10 (1987); Robert L. Rabin, 
Federalism and the Tort System, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1997).  For two quite interesting 
discussions of federalism and tort reform, see generally Betsy J. Grey, The New Federalism 
Jurisprudence and National Tort Reform, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 475 (2002); Gary T. Schwartz, 
Considering the Proper Federal Role in American Tort Law, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 917 (1996). 
 22. See supra note 21.  
 23. One type of restriction concerns attempts by Congress to “commandeer” state political 
branches or officials, an action that the Court has found violates the Tenth Amendment.  See, e.g., 
Printz vs. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (striking down portions of the Brady Handgun 
Violence Protection Act); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (striking down portion 
of the Low-level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendment Act of 1985).  Similarly, the Court has used 
the rubric of the Eleventh Amendment to limit Congressional power to abrogate the immunity of the 
states from suit in federal court. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) 
(finding that Congress lacks authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the “Indian 
Commerce Clause”). 
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 39 [2006], Iss. 4, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss4/3
ALLENFINAL.DOC 2/26/2007  9:30:07 AM 
2006] SURVEY OF FEDERAL “TORT REFORM” 917 
would not expect it to do so in the area of tort reform. 
At its heart, then, the federalism argument is really a political one.  
It concerns whether the federal government should act in a certain area, 
not whether it is constitutionally able to do so.  The answer to that 
question is one of policy.  In sum, the federalism objection has little 
merit in and of itself under the Constitution. 
Turning from the Constitution, there are also purely political issues 
that may make federal tort reform less attractive than similar efforts 
undertaken at the state level.  As I mentioned above, a simultaneous 
advantage and disadvantage of substantive legislation is that there is 
little ambiguity concerning the goals of the government action.  Such 
transparency in lawmaking might be something to be admired in 
political theory, but it can also lead to the energizing of opposition 
forces.24  Such a result is even more likely when the reform efforts are 
being attempted on the national stage.  Accordingly, the politics of tort 
reform might lead one to focus greater energy on state efforts, at least in 
some cases. 
Of course, even if there are constitutional and political issues 
counseling hesitation in terms of proceeding on the federal level, one 
should not discount the very real practical advantages associated with 
such substantive legislation when it can be implemented.  Most 
obviously, the geographic impact of federal legislation is a major asset.  
The passage of a single law can achieve one’s aim instead of pursuing 
the goal one state at a time.  Moreover, the costs associated with 
obtaining, and perhaps preserving, tort reform victories should be less 
when dealing with the national stage.25  Finally, the power of federal 
legislation comes not only from its geographic sweep but from its 
constitutional pedigree.  Under the Supremacy Clause, validly enacted 
federal law trumps or preempts inconsistent state law on the matter in 
question.26  The effects of the Supremacy Clause and the related, albeit 
distinct concept of preemption that is covered later in this Essay27 ensure 
 
 24. Others have also noted this possibility.  See, e.g., Segall, supra note 13 at 391-92. 
 25. See Marshall, supra note 18, at 723 (discussing economic advantages of federal tort 
reform). 
 26. U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2.  This article states: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding. 
Id. 
 27. See infra Part I.B.2. 
9
Allen: Survey of Federal "Tort Reform"
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2006
ALLENFINAL.DOC 2/26/2007  9:30:07 AM 
918 AKRON LAW REVIEW [39:909 
that substantive federal tort reform legislation is infused with extra 
power.  
In sum, substantive federal tort reform legislation has both certain 
advantages and certain disadvantages from the perspectives of its 
proponents.  Federal authority, unlike that of the states, is limited.  In 
addition, the stakes of national legislation may make its enactment more 
difficult.  On the other hand, when it is possible to use the federal stage, 
the results will tend to be powerful in a variety of ways. 
B.  Judicial Decisions 
Tort reform is not solely the prerogative of legislatures.  On both 
the state and the federal levels, the judicial branch of government has 
played and will continue to play an important role in the area.28  That 
involvement is in some sense unilateral; that is, in some cases the courts 
take steps on their own that have an impact on the tort system.  In other 
areas, the courts’ role is intimately tied to what has come before in the 
political branches.  Such is the case when a court is called on to interpret 
a statutory tort reform measure.  The special role of courts in the tort 
reform arena is one that should not be neglected.  When the courts are 
engaged in activity in concert with or in opposition to the legislature, the 
impact of reform efforts of one branch will be dependent in some 
measure on actions in another.  In this section, I address the role of the 
federal courts in tort reform by considering three areas: the Constitution; 
statutory interpretation, particularly the doctrine of preemption; and 
federal common law.  My ultimate conclusion as to court-centered tort 
reform is that it can be quite powerful but also quite unpredictable and 
uncontrollable, at least from the perspective of tort reform advocates. 
1.  The Constitution 
Perhaps the most powerful form of federal judicial tort reform is 
constitutional interpretation.29 Marbury v. Madison30 with its recognition 
 
 28. The general role of courts in the development and reform of the tort system is not without 
controversy.  See, e.g., Symposium: Tort Liability, The Structural Constitution, and the States, 31 
SETON HALL L. REV. 563-759 (2001) (debating respective roles of courts and legislatures). 
 29. Decisions of state supreme courts interpreting state constitutions have also proved to be 
quite powerful in tort reform matters.  Some state supreme courts have struck down legislative tort 
reform measures for violating state constitutions.  See, e.g., Ferdon v. Wisconsin Patients 
Compensation Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440 (Wis. 2005) (holding tort reform in violation of Wisconsin 
Constitution); State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E. 2d 1062 (holding 
tort reform in violation of Ohio 1999) (Ohio Constitution); Smith v. Dept. of Insurance, 507 So.2d 
1080 (Fla. 1987) (Florida Constitution).  No less “tort reform,” courts in other states have rejected 
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of judicial review means that absent a decision of a later Court or an 
amendment to the Constitution, the Court’s constitutional decisions are 
the most supreme of supreme federal law.31  I have already mentioned a 
type of constitutional interpretation that can affect tort reform measures, 
the determination of the scope of Congressional power.32  But the 
constitutional issues also potentially implicate a variety of individual 
rights ranging from due process, to the jury trial guarantee of the 
Seventh Amendment, to equal protection.  Decisions of the federal 
courts in these areas are no less significant than those dealing with 
Congressional authority under the Constitution.  Indeed, they may be 
more so because most decisions involving individual rights will be 
applicable to state reforms as well as federal ones.33  I discuss below in 
this Part two constitutional doctrines that have had, and will likely 
continue to have, significant effects on tort reform measures.34 
A first example concerns the Supreme Court’s relatively recent 
delineation of federal constitutional limits on punitive damage awards.35  
 
state constitutional challenges to legislative reform measures.  See, e.g., Colorado v. DeFoor, 824 
P.2d 783 (Colo. 1992) (finding no violation of either Colorado and United States Constitutions); 
Etheridge v. Medical Center Hospitals, 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989) (finding no violation of either 
Virginia and United States Constitutions). 
 30. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803). 
 31. Id. at 177 (stating that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is.”); see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (reaffirming the 
Court’s role as final arbiter of the meaning of the Constitution). 
 32. See supra Part I.A. 
 33. The general subject of the constitutionality of tort reform measures has been widely 
addressed in the academic literature.  See, e.g., Apelbaum & Ryder, supra note 1, at 635-57; Peck, 
supra notes 6, at 674-82; George L. Priest, The Constitutionality of State Tort Reform Legislation 
and Lochner, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 683, 684-87 (2001); Victor E. Schwartz, Judicial 
Nullification of Tort Reform: Ignoring History, Logic, and Fundamentals of Constitutional Law, 31 
SETON HALL L. REV. 688, 690-92 (2001). 
 34. I could have chosen a number of other examples to make my point concerning 
constitutional tort reform.  So, for example, I could have discussed certain of the Court’s 
constitutional decisions that have had an impact on state defamation law.  See, e.g., New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (imposing under the Constitution a higher burden on 
public officials to prove defamation); see also Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., U.S. Supreme Court Tort 
Reform: Limiting State Power to Articulate and Develop its own Tort Law - - Defamation, 
Preemption, and Punitive Damages, 74 U. CINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (discussing “tort 
reform” concerning defamation law).  Similarly, I could have discussed here the Court’s due 
process decisions restricting the use of settlement classes in asbestos litigation.  See, e.g., Amchem 
Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (decertifying settlement class in global asbestos as 
part of proposed global settlement agreement in part in due process grounds).  I made my selections 
as a means to demonstrate the wide variety of possible constitutional tort reform measures.  I 
certainly have not attempted to be comprehensive. 
 35. See e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); Cooper 
Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 
517 U.S. 559 (1996).  I have written elsewhere about the development of the Court’s jurisprudence 
11
Allen: Survey of Federal "Tort Reform"
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2006
ALLENFINAL.DOC 2/26/2007  9:30:07 AM 
920 AKRON LAW REVIEW [39:909 
Most prominently, the Court has interpreted the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to contain a principle of proportionality 
limiting the size of punitive damage judgments.36 Oversimplifying 
somewhat, the Court has tied the constitutionally permissible range of 
punitive damages to the compensatory damages that were or could have 
been awarded against the defendant.37 
The Court’s punitive damages decisions quite clearly are an 
example of judicial tort reform.  The Court identified a perceived 
problem involving excessive damage awards principally in tort or tort-
like litigation.38  Its solution to that problem was to restrict those awards 
directly via the Due Process Clause.39  Thus, as with substantive 
legislation, constitutional tort reform in this area has a decent chance of 
succeeding, assuming lower courts follow the Supreme Court’s lead, 
because there is such a close tie between the perceived problem and 
proposed solution.  Moreover, such constitutional tort reform has the 
additional advantage (if one is in favor of the reform) of binding state 
and federal courts.  It is also insulated from legislative change.  The 
downside, of course, is that implementing tort reform through the courts 
is not as easy to control as it usually is through the legislative process.  
For example, one needs to find a case in which to advance a particular 
 
concerning constitutional limits on punitive damage awards.  See Michael P. Allen, The Supreme 
Court, Punitive Damages and State Sovereignty, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 (2004).  Dean Galligan 
has also written on the tort reform aspects of these decisions.  See Galligan, supra note 34.  
 36. See, e.g., Campbell, 538 U.S. at 418; Gore, 517 U.S. at 575-76.  The Court’s 
constitutional work in this area has not, however, been limited to the due process proportionality 
principle.  For example, it has also imposed a state sovereignty based limitation on certain awards.  
See, e.g., Campbell, 538 U.S. at 421; Gore, 517 U.S. at 568-74; see also Allen, supra note. 35 
(discussing the Court’s sovereignty-based approach).  Indeed, there is a strong argument that the 
Court has done more than simply impose constitutional limits on the size of punitive damage 
awards.  Instead, it appears in many respects that the Court has “constitutionalized” the very nature 
of this remedial device.  See, e.g., Allen, supra note 35, at 35-36 n. 148 (discussing this issue); 
Michael L. Rustad, Happy No More: Federalism Derailed by the Court that Would be King of 
Punitive Damages, 64 MD. L. REV. 461, 493-515 (2005) (same).  A full exploration of this issue is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  My point is that the ways in which the Court has used constitutional 
interpretation to deal with a perceived tort-based problem are quite varied. 
 37. In the interests of accuracy, the Court has set forth three “guideposts” by which to judge 
the constitutionality of punitive damage awards under the Due Process Clause: the (1) degree of 
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct; (2) ratio of actual or potential harm suffered by the 
plaintiff to the punitive damages awarded; and (3) civil or criminal sanctions that could be imposed 
on the defendant for comparable conduct.  Gore, 517 U.S. at 575.  In the Court’s most recent 
pronouncement on the issue it stated that in most cases a double-digit ratio of punitive damages to 
compensatory damages would be unconstitutional.  Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425. 
 38. See, e.g., Campbell, 538 U.S. at 417-18 (discussing perceived dangers associated with 
awarding punitive damages in a civil lawsuit). 
 39. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 418; Gore, 514 U.S. at 575-76. 
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goal.  Thereafter, the “lobbying” for reform needs to be in the context of 
litigation, making policy-based arguments standing alone at least 
marginally more difficult.  Thus, while constitutional tort reform is an 
incredibly powerful means by which to proceed, it may not be the best 
approach if other more controllable means exist. 
A second, and somewhat less obvious, matter of constitutional tort 
reform is the Court’s landmark decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins40 
and its progeny.  The “Erie Doctrine” stands for the basic proposition 
that federal courts in diversity and other state law based cases must 
apply the substantive law that a state court of the state in which the 
federal court sits would apply.41  There are many theories about Erie, its 
constitutional foundations, and its ultimate meaning.42  I am certainly not 
about to enter that debate here.  Rather, my point is a limited one: an 
effect of Erie and its progeny, whether intended or contemplated, is 
functionally similar to tort reform.  The decision took the federal courts 
out of the business of generally crafting common law, including tort-
based principles.43  As a result, state courts would have the predominate 
role in the area.  Erie, then, provides another example of the way in 
which constitutional decisions can impede legislative efforts (here on the 
federal level) to address perceived problems in the tort system.44  
Paradoxically perhaps, such impediments are also tort reform in their 
own right; they simply operate in a different direction than more 
 
 40. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 41. Id. at 78; see also Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (requiring 
federal courts to follow state choice of law rules). 
 42. The academic literature on Erie is legion.  Some of the more prominent discussions of the 
case include the following: Susan Bandes, Erie and the History of the One True Federalism, 110 
YALE L.J. 829 (2001) (reviewing EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE 
CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN 
TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA (2000)); Joseph P. Bauer, The Erie Doctrine Revisited: How a 
Conflicts Perspective Can Aid the Analysis, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1235 (1999); Henry J. 
Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964); 
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL 
POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA (2000). 
 43. Indeed, it should not be forgotten that Erie itself was a tort case.  See Erie, 304 U.S. 64.  
In addition, there were tort cases among those decisions that served as evidence to some of the need 
to establish a regime in which federal common lawmaking was restricted.  See, e.g., Baltimore & 
Ohio Railroad v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368 (1893) (concerning federal adoption of fellow-servant rule).  
Professor Betsy Grey has also recently written about the way in which the Erie doctrine is 
implicated in the tort reform debate, especially with respect to the constitutionality of federal tort 
reform.  See Grey, supra note 21, at 480-89. 
 44. Other commentators have made this point as well.  See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Class 
Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A Proposed Federal Procedure Act, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1039, 1076 
(1986) (hereafter “Mullenix, Federal Procedure Act”) (“The Erie doctrine has repeatedly proven to 
be a major impediment to the fair adjudication of mass-tort claims  . . .”). 
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affirmative action.45 
Both the recent punitive damages decisions as well as the more 
established Erie Doctrine are excellent examples of the Court’s ability to 
affect changes in the tort system through constitutional rulings.  
Recognizing this means of tort reform is important because it suggests 
both a potential means of affirmatively reforming the tort system as well 
as a potential limitation on substantive tort reform legislation undertaken 
by another branch of government.  So, for example, advocates of further 
limitations on runaway damage awards will no doubt press constitutional 
attacks designed to extend the Gore/Campbell logic.46  On the other 
hand, creative arguments are being made against tort reform based on 
the federal Constitution.47  The fundamental point is that the judiciary is 
a powerful institution in the tort reform debate as a result of its ability to 
interpret the Constitution. 
2.  Statutory Interpretation and Preemption 
The reality that courts interpret legislation means that the judiciary 
will always be an important part of tort reform efforts.  Congress or state 
legislatures may enact substantive tort reform measures, but those laws 
will only be as effective as courts interpret them to be.  However, on the 
federal level there is an additional statutory interpretation issue that 
makes the judiciary an even more important player in the tort reform 
debate.  That issue concerns “preemption.” 
The central idea of preemption is that federal law may displace 
state law in a given area under certain circumstances. That occurs, 
according to the Supreme Court, when Congress acts pursuant to a valid 
power and expressly states that it intends to preempt state law.48  But 
preemption is not only possible in this way.  The Court has also held that 
preemption can be inferred from the presence of a comprehensive 
 
 45. Interestingly, Erie and the multiplicity of state laws that must be applied in complex cases 
such as class actions have led to calls by modern-day tort reformers for a federal choice of law 
statute to make complex cases easier to administer.  See, e.g., John S. Baker, Jr., Respecting a 
State’s Tort Law, While Confining its Reach to That State, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 698, 716-32 
(2001); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Kenneth D. Sibley, Beyond Diversity: Federal Multiparty, 
Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 7, 37-41 (1986). 
 46. See Mark Geistfeld, Constitutional Tort Reform, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1093 (2005) 
(arguing that the due process principles from Gore and Campbell cannot be limited to punitive 
damages but are applicable to other issues in the tort system). 
 47. See, e.g., John C. P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and 
the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L. J. 524 (2005) (arguing for a due process 
limit on certain types of damage limitation in tort actions). 
 48. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). 
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federal regulatory scheme,49 the fact that state law would act as an 
obstacle to achieving Congress’s purpose,50 or when state law is 
inconsistent with federal law.51  And the courts determine the question of 
Congressional intent. 
The preemption doctrine as currently structured is a powerful 
illustration of judicial tort reform.52  Determining how narrowly or how 
broadly a federal law will displace state tort law is in many respects the 
equivalent of a legislative judgment by Congress concerning express 
preemption.  In either situation, state tort policy will (or will not) be 
replaced with a federal judgment.53  Thus, through the preemption 
doctrine, the federal judiciary remains an important player in the 
debate.54 
 
 49. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
 50. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
 51. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).  In a 
recent article, Professor Stephen Gardbaum has persuasively argued that such conflict preemption is 
better viewed as an automatic operation of the Supremacy Clause. See Stephen Gardbaum, 
Congress’s Power to Preempt the States, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 39, 40-43 (2005).  As to the other forms 
of preemption, he further asserts that only express preemption is appropriate.  Id.  Without taking a 
position as to Professor Gardbaum’s ultimate assertions, his difficulty in accepting implied 
preemption and its inherent subjectivity in terms of determining Congressional intent underscores 
the point I make in this section; current preemption doctrine is in many ways a form of judicial not 
legislative tort reform. 
 52. There has been significant academic commentary concerning preemption doctrine and its 
impact on the tort system.  See, e.g., Richard C. Ausness, Preemption of State Tort Law by Federal 
Safety Statutes: Supreme Court Preemption Jurisprudence Since Cipollone, 92 KY. L. REV. 913 
(2003-2004); Galligan, supra note 34; Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal 
Preemption of State Tort Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REV. 559 (1997); Robert B. Leflar & Robert S. 
Adler, The Preemption Pentad: Federal Preemption of Products Liability Claims After Medtronic, 
64 TENN. L. REV. 691 (1997); Martin S. Scordato, Federal Preemption of State Tort Claims, 35 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2001); David C. Vladeck, Preemption and Regulatory Failure, 33 PEPP. L. 
REV. 95 (2005); Timothy Wilton, Federalism Issues in “No Airbag” Tort Claims: Preemption and 
Reciprocal Comity, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1986). For a recent thoughtful discussion of the 
serious federalism issues implicated by preemption, see Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. 
Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization: Grappling with the “Risk to the Rest of the Country,” 53 UCLA 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2006). 
 53. This effect can be seen in numerous Supreme Court cases.  See, e.g., Bates v. Dow 
Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788 (2005) (holding that the Federal Fungicide, Insecticide and 
Rodenticide Act did not preempt all state common law claims); Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 
U.S. 51 (2002) (holding that the Federal Boat Safety Act did not preempt all state law design defect 
claims); Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (holding that state tort law claim 
based on the absence of an airbag was preempted by the National Highway Safety Act); Medtronic 
v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (the Court issued a splintered decision concerning the preemptive 
scope of the Medical Devices Act); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (holding 
that Public Health Cigarette Act of 1969 preempted the plaintiff’s state tort law claims). 
 54. Because preemption decisions are based on interpretations of statutes, the judicial branch 
does not have the last word on the matter.  Congress could amend a given statute if it was displeased 
with a court decision.  This is yet another example of the interaction between the branches that can 
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3.  Federal Common Lawmaking 
A final, often neglected form of federal judicial tort reform is the 
federal courts’ limited, but powerful, ability to craft federal common 
law.  While Erie prohibited federal courts from crafting general 
common law,55 it allowed for the development of federal common law in 
specific areas.56  Such federal common law can be an important tool for 
federal tort reform.57 
What exactly is “federal common law” after Erie?  At its broadest 
level, one could include statutory interpretation generally and 
preemption in particular as an example of a federal court crafting 
common law rules.58  I have discussed those matters above.59  Here, I 
focus on a narrower definition of federal common law by which I mean 
situations in which federal courts craft the rules of decision in a case 
either on their own or pursuant to a Congressional instruction but in 
which the courts are not purporting to interpret a substantive federal 
statute.60 
Tort reform could be accomplished using federal common law in a 
number of ways.  Perhaps most significantly, Congress could authorize 
the federal courts to develop a body of substantive law in a specific area 
 
be so critical in determining the success of reform efforts. Indeed, the Congress and the courts are 
not alone on the preemption playing field.  Recently, the Bush Administration has advanced a strong 
version of “executive preemption.”  See, e.g., Anna Wilde Mathews, FDA Plan Would Aid Drug 
Makers in Liability Suits, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Jan. 14-15, 2006, at A1; Marc Kaufman, 
FDA Tries to Limit Drug Suits in State Courts, THE WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 19, 2006, at A2.  
Assuming such executive preemption is constitutionally authorized, its use would be a further type 
of federal tort reform. 
 55. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (asserting that “[t]here is no federal general common law.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 56. See Friendly, supra note 42 at 405 (discussing growth of specific federal common law 
after Erie).  The scope, validity and wisdom of making federal common law are hotly debated issues 
in the literature.  See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL MELTZER, & DAVID SHAPIRO, HART & 
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 685-98 (4th 3d. 2003) (hereafter 
“HART & WECHSLER”) (discussing various issues concerning federal common lawmaking). 
 57. State courts can also engage in tort reform efforts through general common law 
development.  As with federal legislation, however, the advantages of federal common law when it 
can be made are its geographic scope and constitutional power under the Supremacy Clause. 
 58. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 56, at 685-86 (discussing potentially quite broad 
definition of federal common law). 
 59. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 60. A related matter that could also be considered federal common law under my definition is 
the implication of a private right of action under a federal statute.  On the one hand such a decision 
can be seen as merely statutory interpretation.  But it could also be viewed as something more akin 
to what I have included as part of federal common lawmaking.  For a general discussion of implied 
private rights of action in the context of federal common law, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 
56 at 758-825. 
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of tort law such as product liability.61  The argument for the 
constitutionality of such a direction is that Congress legislated in the 
area under its Commerce Clause authority (or some other constitutional 
basis) but left the details in the development of the law to the federal 
courts.62  More controversially, the federal courts might be able to 
develop such federal common law “spontaneously” if the federal interest 
present was sufficient enough and Congress had not acted.63  In short, 
while the potential for federal common lawmaking has been largely 
untapped, it is a serious means by which tort reform could be 
accomplished.64  But as with the other types of judicial tort reform, 
controlling the development of federal common law would be quite 
difficult. 
C.  Procedural Legislation 
Both the substantive legislation and court decisions discussed thus 
far generally have in common the directness of the “solution” to the 
identified “problem.”  There are, however, a number of more indirect 
methods by which one can pursue tort reform goals.  In this Part I 
consider one such indirect method, the use of procedure and related 
rules.65  Before doing so, I acknowledge that such procedural reforms 
might not be the most effective means of addressing a perceived 
 
 61. Professor Linda Mullenix has suggested that such federal common lawmaking would be 
appropriate in the area of complex litigation, including mass torts and product liability.  See, e.g., 
Linda S. Mullenix, Complex Litigation Reform and Article III Jurisdiction, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 
169, 196-211 (1990) (hereafter Mullenix, Complex Litigation Reform); Mullenix, Federal 
Procedure Act, supra note 44, at 1077-79. 
 62. The Court has upheld such action by Congress in other areas.  See, e.g., Textile Workers 
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (interpreting Section 301 of the Labor-Management 
Relations Act as authorizing the federal courts to develop a body of federal common law).  I discuss 
jurisdictional issues more fully below.  See infra Part I.D.  Of course, success in this tactic would 
require the Court to determine that congressional power over interstate commerce actually extended 
far enough to support such an enactment.  I have discussed this issue above.  See supra Part I.A. 
 63. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988) (crafting common law 
defense in tort action concerning a government contractor).  Action in this regard would be 
particularly controversial because there is wide agreement that general rules of tort liability are not 
within the common lawmaking authority of the federal courts.  See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 
56, at 696. 
 64. Indeed, there is a strong argument that Congress and the courts have used federal common 
lawmaking in the context of tort reform broadly defined.  I discuss this issue further below in 
connection with certain of the federal government’s actions after the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks.  See infra Part II.  Other scholars have suggested that development of federal common law 
could be used to address the difficulties that can be caused by the Erie Doctrine.  See, e.g., Donald 
T. Trautmman, Toward Federalizing Choice of Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1715 (1992). 
 65. For an interesting symposium discussing the use of procedure as tort reform, see 
Symposium:  National Mass Tort Conference, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1523-1845 (1995). 
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problem in the tort system.  After all, unlike substantive legislation, 
procedural enactments are a step removed from addressing any given 
problem.  As a result, procedural tort reform could be seen as less likely 
to achieve one’s substantive goal.66  Yet, even if this is so, there may be 
instances where procedural tort reform is the preferred course.  For 
example, it may be that a given substantive problem is difficult to 
address head on.  This could be because of problems associated with the 
substantive reform itself (such as redefining the common law standard of 
negligence in a way to achieve a desired result) or of political difficulties 
concerning a head-on approach.  The point is that procedural reform, 
even if not as effective as substantive action, has an important role to 
play in tort reform efforts.67 
There are many reforms that could be grouped under the heading 
“procedural.”  Most obviously, perhaps, are the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure governing the “cradle to grave” aspects of a civil lawsuit.  
Amendments to and interpretations of those rules will have an impact on 
the ease of commencing a suit,68 the ability to gather evidence,69 and the 
likelihood of avoiding trial70 to name but a few possibilities.71  Such 
 
 66. It may also be the case that judging the effectiveness of procedural reform is more 
difficult than it is for more direct tort reform measures.  I leave this empirical point aside for present 
purposes. 
 67. It is precisely the potential for effective procedural reform that has prompted certain 
commentators to decry the tactic.  See, e.g., JoEllen Lind, “Procedural Swift”: Complex Litigation 
Reform, State Tort Law, and Democratic Values, 37 AKRON L. REV. 717, 720 (2004). 
 68. It is standard fare that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure formally adopt a notice 
pleading standard under which a plaintiff needs to say relatively little in order to commerce a 
lawsuit and take advantage of the myriad discovery devices available in federal court.  See Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring only that a party asserting a claim present “a short and plain statement of 
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”).  And the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
underscored this fundamental premise of pleading.  See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 
U.S. 506 (2002) (no heightened pleading requirements for employment discrimination claims); 
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993) (no 
heightened pleading requirements for civil rights claims). Thus, the formal rules and 
pronouncements from the Court are plaintiff-friendly in this regard.  But this perspective tells only a 
part of the story.  As Professor Fairman has demonstrated, the lower federal courts are far less 
supportive of liberal notice pleading.  See Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 
ARIZ. L. REV. 987 (2003).  If this is the case, then the lower federal courts are engaged in procedural 
reform of their own, which could have an impact on all civil cases in the federal system, including 
tort lawsuits.  Moreover, this intra-judiciary difference in approach shows that the role of courts in 
tort reform is not necessarily unitary and is certainly difficult to predict. 
 69. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contain a wide array of means by which parties are 
able to discover information from both parties and non-parties alike.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37, 45.  
To the extent those rules are amended or interpreted to enhance or restrict discovery, there will be 
an impact on the ability of parties to prepare their claims and defenses. 
 70. For example, the increased ability to obtain summary judgment under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 56 allows defendants to avoid trial in a great number of cases.  See, e.g., Celetox 
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general procedural rules will have an impact at some level on tort 
cases.72  Of course, that impact will also be felt in all other types of cases 
as well.73 
It is also possible to engage in more targeted procedural reform.  
While such an effort will remain indirect, it will have a greater chance of 
addressing a specific problem such as perceived abuse in the tort system.  
An example of such targeted reform is the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”).74  The PSLRA dealt with concern over 
perceived abuses in the plaintiff securities class action bar, a situation 
similar in many respects to current complaints concerning attorneys 
representing plaintiffs in certain tort matters.75  Among other things, the 
PSLRA adopted a heightened pleading standard for securities fraud 
claims.76  The targeted procedural statute was used as a means to achieve 
a more substantive result: the reduction in a certain class of lawsuit.  The 
same type of targeted procedural statute could also be used to achieve 
substantive results with respect to aspects of the tort reform debate.77 
As with substantive legislation, the types of procedural reforms I 
have discussed are possible at both the state and federal levels.78  Federal  
 
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (relaxing standards for granting summary judgment to 
defendants in federal court). 
 71. Another important procedural matter in the context of tort reform is legislation concerning 
the class action device.  I discuss this issue below.  See infra Part I.D. 
 72. See Lind, supra note 67, at 775-76 (cataloguing ways in which federal procedural rules 
can affect substantive outcomes in cases shifted from state to federal court). 
 73. A similar type of general procedural reform measure can be seen in amendments to or 
interpretations of rules of evidence.  So, for example, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence requiring trial courts to serve as more aggressive gate-keepers to prevent 
the admission of “junk science” will have an impact on cutting-edge tort cases as well as other 
envelope-pushing litigation.  See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 
(1993); see also Michael H. Gottesman, Should Federal Rules Trump State Tort Policy? The 
Federalism Values Daubert Ignored, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1837 (1994) (critically discussing the 
effect of evidentiary ruling on substantive state tort law). 
 74. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (Dec. 22 1995). 
 75. Compare ATRA statement concerning PSLRA, see http://www.atra.org/reform/federal/? 
law=pslra, with its description of the need for product liability reform.  See 
http://www.atra.org/issues/index.php?issue=7341 (last visited May 12, 2006). 
 76. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(b)(1)(B) (requiring that covered securities fraud complaints 
“specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is 
misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on information and 
belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.”). 
 77. For example, a prominent academic commentator has argued for some time that there 
should be a federal procedural solution to a perceived problem in the handling of mass tort cases.  
See e.g., Mullenix, Proposed Federal Procedure Act, supra note 44.  Another example of this 
approach to reform can be found in the Class Action Fairness Act, which I discuss below.  See infra 
Part I.D. 
 78. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a) (requiring a separate proceeding for the award of 
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reform is particularly important because a change in federal procedure 
will have a national impact and affect all cases in the federal system.79  
Thus, a single procedural reform can have an impact that would 
otherwise be possible only by engaging in repeated reform efforts on the 
state level.  Accordingly, the jurisdictional tort reform efforts I discuss 
below in which cases are moved from state to federal courts take on 
increased importance.80 
On the legislative horizon rests a type of federal procedural reform 
that is markedly different from any of the reforms already discussed.  
Currently pending in the United States House of Representatives is the 
Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act.81  On one level, this Act is an 
unremarkable (if not necessarily wise) example of the types of 
procedural reform I have been discussing.  In that regard, it seeks to 
amend Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 in a number of ways, 
including making sanctions for filing a baseless lawsuit mandatory, 
removing the “safe harbor” provision for withdrawing a paper filed in 
violation of Rule 11, and increasing the types of sanctions that may be 
awarded under the rule.82  In other words, the Act is a prototypical 
attempt to use procedure to reach a desired substantive goal. 
The Act is noteworthy, however, because it does not stop at merely 
amending a rule of federal procedure. Instead, the proposed legislation 
provides that the amended version of federal Rule 11 shall be applied by 
state courts in any lawsuit that “substantially affects interstate 
commerce.”83  Thus, the legislation seeks to apply a federal procedural 
“solution” through the state courts.  This tactic is not new, having been 
applied by Congress with respect to certain targeted matters.84  However, 
 
punitive damages); Fla. Stat. § 768.72 (requiring plaintiff to obtain permission of the court to assert 
claim for punitive damages). 
 79. Importantly in this regard, the Supreme Court has held that one almost always uses federal 
procedural rules in federal court instead of following the procedural law of the states.  See, e.g., 
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
 80. See infra Part I.D. 
 81. H.R. 420, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 82. Id. at § 2. 
 83. Id. at § 3. 
In any civil action in State court, the court, upon motion, shall determine within 30 days 
after the filing of such motion whether the action substantially affects interstate 
commerce.  Such court shall make such determination based on an assessment of the 
costs to the interstate economy, including the loss of jobs, were the relief requested 
granted.  If the court determines such action substantially affects interstate commerce, 
the provisions of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall apply to such 
action. 
Id. 
 84. See, e.g., Y2K Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6601-17 (providing for heightened pleading 
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the current legislation is significant for its broad brush approach to all 
types of litigation, or at least all types of litigation substantially affecting 
interstate commerce.85 
While the future of the current proposal and the prospects of similar 
legislation are not certain, the possibilities for federal procedural reform 
using a similar model are striking.  For example, if Congress has the 
power to require state courts to apply federal procedural law in cases not 
based on federal substantive law,86 then Congress could require the use 
of heightened pleading burdens for all or some subset of tort claims 
substantially affecting interstate commerce.  Or it could provide for 
increased or restricted discovery in such cases.  The point is that the 
extension of procedure-making power to include state courts would be a 
significant augmentation of Congressional power to engage in tort 
reform.  Time will tell if Congress actually exercises such power and if 
the Constitution indeed provides for it. 
D.  Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
The final category of federal tort reform is one that is uniquely 
available on the national level.  Under the Constitution, there are two 
generic court systems in the United States, those of the States, which 
remained in existence after the ratification of the Constitution, and those 
of the federal government, which were provided for under the 
Constitution.  While there was no constitutional mandate for a federal 
judiciary beyond the Supreme Court,87 there have in fact been inferior 
 
requirements in state courts for certain claims relating to Year 2000 computer issues); Biomaterials 
Access Assurance Act of 1998, 21 U.S.C. §§ 1601-06 (providing rules for motions to dismiss and 
for summary judgment in certain cases filed in state court). 
 85. H.R. 420, 109th Cong., sec 3 (2005). The Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act is also 
noteworthy because it attempts to regulate in which state courts certain types of action may be filed.  
So, for example, it provides that a personal injury plaintiff may commence a covered action in one 
of three places only: the plaintiff’s home state, the defendant’s principal place of business or 
residence, or the location in which the activity alleged to be unlawful took place.  Id. at sec. 4.  This 
type of procedural reform faces its own constitutional challenges.  See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., 
Congressional Power and State Court Jurisdiction, 94 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2006) (discussing 
defects in LARA). 
 86. The extent of Congressional power to control state court procedures has been the subject 
of recent academic discussion.  See, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court 
Procedures, 110 YALE L.J. 947 (2001); Wendy E. Parmet, Stealth Preemption: The Proposed 
Federalization of State Court Procedures, 44 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1999); Margaret G. Stewart, 
Federalism and Supremacy: Control of State Judicial Decision-Making, 68 CHI-KENT L. REV. 431 
(1992). 
 87. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in 
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish.”). 
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federal courts since the founding of the Republic under the 
Constitution.88  The jurisdiction of the two respective court systems in 
our American judicial federalism is not co-extensive.  Most significantly 
for present purposes, the Court has long interpreted the Constitution to 
establish the outer limits of potential federal court jurisdiction.89 
Another important and fundamental principle is that the original 
jurisdiction of the federal courts is not self-executing.90  Instead, 
Congress must confer jurisdiction upon the federal courts.91  The 
Constitution provides Congress with a significant power to affect the 
allocation (and potentially the outcome) of litigation by exercising its 
authority under Article III, section 2 to confer jurisdiction.  That 
authority is restricted only by the outer limits of the subjects to which 
the judicial power may be extended.  Within that universe, the allocation 
of judicial authority is solely in the collective hands of Congress.92  
Accordingly, it is possible for Congress to use its jurisdiction-granting 
power as a means to implement tort reform at the federal level. 
In this section I explore the ways in which Congress has used 
subject matter jurisdiction as attempted tort reform as well situations in 
which it could do so in the future.  Before doing so, however, it is worth 
considering why Congress would use jurisdictional means to implement 
 
 88. Congress established inferior federal courts in the Judiciary Act of 1789.  See An Act to 
Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, 1st Cong., 1 Stat. 73 (1789). 
 89. Article III contains a list of nine topics over which the “judicial power shall extend.”  U.S. 
Const., art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  The Court has interpreted this list to constitute the maximum jurisdictional 
reach of the federal judiciary.  See, e.g., Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809); see 
also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 3.4 (4th ed. 2003). 
 90. See, e.g., The Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. 247, 251-52 (1867); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 
448-49 (1850). 
 91. Sheldon, 49 U.S. at 448-449. 
 92. There is a long-running academic debate concerning the ability of Congress to “strip” the 
federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction in specific areas.  See, e.g., Michael P. Allen, Congress 
and Terri Schiavo: A Primer on the American Constitutional Order?, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 309, 323 
n.66 (2005) (collecting academic commentary on jurisdiction stripping legislation); HART & 
WECHSLER, supra note 56, at 319-61 (same and providing extensive commentary on the issue).  
Thus, whether Congress could eliminate federal court jurisdiction for either or both the Supreme 
Court and/or the inferior courts over certain types of lawsuits, such as those concerning challenges 
to state laws restricting the right of a woman to seek an abortion for example, is a hotly debated 
matter.  I need not address these matters here because in the context of federal tort reform the 
jurisdictional issue concerns granting jurisdiction only.  It is in this context that I assert that the 
Constitution does not limit Congress beyond setting the outer limits of jurisdiction.  In this respect, I 
am in good company.  See, e.g., Cooper, 73 U.S. at 251-52; Sheldon, 49 U.S. at 448-49; Turner v. 
Bank of North America, 4 U.S. 8, 9 (1799) (opinion of Chase, J.).  On the state level, jurisdiction 
stripping is highly relevant to tort reform.  This issue is addressed by Professor Tracy Thomas in 
this symposium.  See Tracy A. Thomas, Restriction of Tort Remedies and the Constraints of Due 
Process:  The Right to an Adequate Remedy, 39 AKRON L. REV. 975 (2006). 
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tort reform, at least without simultaneously enacting substantive 
legislation.93  After all, without altering the substantive law, the creation 
of jurisdiction merely shifts the forum in which a given piece of 
litigation will be resolved.  In fact, there are several reasons why 
jurisdictional legislation might be used in a given situation.  First, 
jurisdictional legislation might be used as a means to subject certain 
forms of litigation to federal procedural rules.  Thus, if the federal rule 
governing the certification of class actions was seen to be more 
restrictive than similar rules in the states, a shift of litigation from one 
system to the other would be a means of reducing the number of 
certified class actions.  It is in this way that, as I discussed above, such 
procedural legislation is itself a type of tort reform.94 
Second, and more importantly, there is evidence to support the 
supposition that shifting the forum can have quite dramatic effects on 
substantive litigation outcomes.  For example, one study reported that 
“[s]tatistical analysis indicates a removal effect for diversity cases in the 
neighborhood of a reduction from even (or 50%) odds for plaintiffs to 
about 35%.”95  Thus, whether for reasons of applicable procedure, the 
nature of the decision-maker, or some other factor, moving cases from 
one court system to another can serve as means to reach substantive 
results, including tort reform.96 
Third, jurisdictional reform may be a means of addressing 
perceived problems in the tort system without simultaneously divesting 
the states of their traditional role in that area.  If Congress adopts 
substantive legislation, the states are divested from that traditional role.97  
However, if Congress “merely” enacts a jurisdictional statute the states 
 
 93. If Congress did enact substantive legislation it is likely that federal subject matter 
jurisdiction would be conferred by general federal question jurisdiction.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
(“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the 
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”).  The issue I primarily address here is when 
Congress establishes federal court jurisdiction without enacting substantive law. 
 94. See supra Part I.C.  Of course, to the extent Congress may impose procedural rules 
directly on state courts this rationale for jurisdictional legislation becomes irrelevant or at least less 
important.  See id. (discussing the imposition of federal procedures on state courts). 
 95. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything 
About the Legal System?  Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 606 
(1998).  The authors went on to note that “[a] further regression controlling for the case-selection 
theory of locale aversion, however, raises the plaintiffs’ odds to 39%.” Id. 
 96. The specific effect of forum on tort actions has recently been considered by Professors 
Eisenberg and Morrison.  See generally Theodore Eisenberg & Trevor W. Morrison, Overlooked in 
the Tort Reform Debate: The Growth of Erroneous Removal, 2 JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUDIES 551 (2005). 
 97. See supra Parts I.A. (discussing substantive legislation) and I.B.2 (discussing preemption 
doctrine). 
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may continue to develop tort law, which the federal courts are 
constitutionally bound to apply.98  Of course, such a middle ground 
solution will only be effective if the problem one has identified is 
separable from substantive tort law.  But assuming that is the case, a 
policymaker may opt for the jurisdictional solution as a means to 
exercise federal authority in a more subtle way than substantive 
lawmaking.99 
Finally, as with other forms of indirect tort reform such as 
procedural legislation, jurisdictional reform may not be as politically 
difficult to implement as substantive legislation could be.  Thus, if one is 
concerned about avoiding political difficulties with a reform measure, 
jurisdictional legislation might be attractive. 
Whatever the reasons, Congress has enacted jurisdictional 
legislation in the tort arena in a variety of ways.  One recently prominent 
means of jurisdictional tort reform concerns diversity jurisdiction.100  
Congress has long provided for general diversity jurisdiction in federal 
courts.101  This provision already provides a means to obtain a federal 
forum in tort cases if the requirements of section 1332 are satisfied.102  
The problem, however, is that the Supreme Court has consistently 
interpreted the statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction to require 
complete diversity of citizenship.103  This is so even though the 
Constitution itself does not require such complete diversity.104 
Congress has seized on its ability to extend diversity jurisdiction by 
relaxing the complete diversity rule as a means to engage in tort 
reform.105  For example, in 2002 Congress passed the poorly-drafted 
 
 98. See supra Part I.B.3 (discussing the Erie Doctrine). 
 99. This rationale usually applies only when Congress exercises its authority to bestow 
jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship.  As I explain at the end of this Part, the same may not  
be true when Congress purports to grant jurisdiction as a “federal question.” 
 100. The Constitution provides for federal courts potentially to have jurisdiction over 
“[c]ontroversies . . . between Citizens of different States.”  U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 101. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000). 
 102. Id.  One of those requirements is that there be a certain amount in controversy (currently 
an amount greater than $75,000) even if the requirements concerning the citizenship of the parties 
are satisfied.  Id.  Constriction or expansion of this amount in controversy can itself be a form of tort 
reform by expanding or limiting access to the federal system.  I particularly thank Professor Doug 
Rendleman for his comments concerning diversity jurisdiction in connection with federal tort 
reform. 
 103. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). 
 104. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 n.13 (1978) (“It is settled 
that complete diversity is not a constitutional requirement.” (citing State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. 
Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967)). 
 105. There are some commentators who have argued that despite apparent authority to the 
contrary, the use of “minimal diversity” statutes is not constitutional.  See, e.g., C. Douglas Floyd, 
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Multiparty Multiform Jurisdictional Act.106  That statute removed the 
complete diversity requirement in certain cases in which “at least 75 
natural persons have died in the accident at a discrete location. . . .”107  
Subject to certain exceptions set out in the statute,108 these accident cases 
would be able to proceed in federal court although state law would still 
govern under Erie. 
A more recent example of such a use of diversity jurisdiction is the 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”).109  CAFA is a complex 
statute filled with potential interpretative issues,110 but its core is fairly 
clear.  Congress created diversity jurisdiction over certain class action 
lawsuits that had previously been confined to the state court systems due 
to the complete diversity requirement.111 It did so specifically to address 
perceived abuses in the complex litigation system in the United States.112  
By shifting these cases from state courts to the federal system, Congress 
sought to achieve a substantive end.  CAFA is another example of the 
use of the power to confer diversity jurisdiction with an effect that is 
indistinguishable from more “traditional” tort reform in many 
 
The Limits of Minimal Diversity, 55 HASTINGS L. J. 613 (2004).  Others have raised concerns based 
more on general principles of federalism.  See, e.g., Georgine Vairo, Judicial v. Congressional 
Federalism: The Implications of the New Federalism Decisions on Mass Tort Cases and Other 
Complex Litigation, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1559 (2000). 
 106. 28 U.S.C. § 1369 (2000).  Evidence of the poor drafting can be seen in the statute’s 
definition of the term “injury,” a word that does not appear in the statute itself.  Id.  For helpful 
discussions of this statute, see Lind, supra note 67, at 737-45: James M. Underwood, Rationality, 
Multiplicity & Legitimacy: Federalization of the Interstate Class Action, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 391, 
435-39 (2004). 
 107. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(a) (2000).  In terms of relaxing the general diversity requirements, the 
statute specifically requires only “minimal diversity” and does not contain a requirement that there 
be any specific amount in controversy.  Id. 
 108. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(2000) (setting forth “[l]imitation of jurisdiction of the 
district courts”). 
 109. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (Feb. 18, 2005). 
 110. See generally Georgene M. Vairo, Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Legal Studies Paper 
No. 2005-22 (Sept. 2005) (hereafter “Vairo, Class Action Fairness”), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=806405 (analyzing CAFA including its ambiguities). 
 111. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, § 4 (Feb. 18, 2005) (“Federal District Court Jurisdiction 
for Interstate Class Actions”).  However, CAFA is not solely a jurisdictional statute.  While it does 
not purport to alter the substantive law concerning liability, it does affect matters beyond 
jurisdiction, whether one terms them substantive, procedural or some mixture of both of these 
classifications.  For example, the statute contains a number of provisions concerning the use of so-
called coupon settlements.  Id. at § 3.  In that same regard, CAFA provides for specific ways in 
which to calculate attorneys’ fees in certain cases.  Id.  Nevertheless, the major thrust of the statute 
is jurisdictional. 
 112. See Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, § 2 (Feb. 18, 2005) (setting forth Congressional 
findings and purpose). 
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respects.113 
A more controversial use of jurisdictional statutes involves the 
creation of federal question jurisdiction.114  If Congress substantively 
legislated under a valid grant of power such as the Commerce Clause or 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,115 there would be no 
jurisdictional issue.  A claim under any such statute would “arise under” 
federal law and Section 1331 would provide a valid jurisdictional 
basis.116 
The dicey issue in federal question cases is when Congress purports 
to grant subject matter jurisdiction under the rubric of a “federal 
question” but where it does not enact substantive legislation.  The Court 
has held that a pure jurisdictional statute – that is one that purports to 
grant the federal courts jurisdiction based on a federal question but that 
does no more than provide for jurisdiction – is not constitutionally 
valid.117  But there are ways in which something that looks a great deal 
like a “pure” jurisdictional statute has been held to be pass constitutional 
muster.  First, a jurisdictional grant can be seen as a command by 
Congress to have the federal courts craft federal common law on the 
subject in question.118  Such an approach would raise the issues I have 
already discussed above concerning federal common law more 
generally.119  It would also be an action in which more would be done 
than shift cases between court systems.  Instead, state law would be 
displaced by federal law, here crafted by the federal judiciary.120 
A second potential means of achieving federal jurisdiction under a 
 
 113. See Vairo, Class Action Fairness, supra note 110 at 1 (describing CAFA as “an integral 
part of President Bush’s tort reform efforts”); see also Issacharoff and Sharkey, supra note 52 
(discussing CAFA in context of federalism issues). 
 114. The Constitution provides that such jurisdiction may be conferred on the federal courts.  
See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all cases in Law and Equity, 
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States and Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under their Authority . . . .”). 
 115. See supra Part I.A. (discussing substantive legislation). 
 116. See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg, 125 S. Ct. 2363, 2366 
(2005); American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916). 
 117. See, e.g., Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989).  Certain commentators have 
argued that the Court’s statements in this regard are dicta and that such statutes should be allowed.  
See, e.g., Segall, supra note 13, at 379-80. 
 118. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (interpreting 
Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act as authorizing the federal courts to develop a 
body of federal common law). 
 119. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 120. I leave to the side the difficult issue of when a court crafting federal common law should 
adopt the relevant state law as the federal common law to be applied.  See HART & WECHSLER, 
supra note 56 at 698-709 (discussing the issue). 
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“pure” jurisdictional statute is to characterize such an effort as a means 
of protecting important federal interests, so-called “protective 
jurisdiction.”121  The possibilities for federal tort reform if protective 
jurisdiction is legitimate are obvious.  Congress could conclude that 
medical malpractice, for example, is a significant federal issue (perhaps 
because of its impact on interstate commerce).  Therefore, Congress 
could enact a jurisdictional statute shifting medical malpractice claims to 
federal court.  State law would still be applied, but the decision maker 
and relevant procedures would have changed.  The difficulty with this 
basis for federal tort reform is that the constitutionality of protective 
jurisdiction is far from clear.122 
The upshot of the discussion in this Part is that Congress’s ability to 
manipulate the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts under 
Article III of the Constitution is a powerful means of engaging in tort 
reform at the national level.123  It is one that has been used in the past 
 
 121. “Generally stated, the concept of protective jurisdiction permits article III federal question 
jurisdiction where a case or controversy does not involve the construction or interpretation of some 
federal law. . . . [P]rotective jurisdiction’s crucial feature is its grant of federal jurisdiction over a 
case predicated upon state, not federal, substantive law.”  Mullenix, Complex Litigation Reform, 
supra note 61, at 199. 
 122. For example, the Court has refused to squarely hold whether “protective jurisdiction” is 
constitutionally permissible.  See, e.g., Mesa, 489 U.S. at 137; Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of 
Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 491 n. 17 (1983). In addition, academic opinions have been mixed 
concerning the constitutionality of this means of conferring federal court jurisdiction.  Some 
commentators believe that protective jurisdiction is a valid means by which Congress can confer 
jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Paul Mishkin, The Federal “Question” in District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. 
REV. 157 (1953); Segall, supra note 13, at 370-92; Herbert Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the 
Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 216 (1948). Others argue that it is not.  
See, e.g., Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, The Protective Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 30 UCLA 
L. REV. 542, 550 (1983); Mullenix, Complex Litigation Reform, supra, note 61, at 198-206.  For an 
overview of the issue, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 56, at 840-55. 
 Despite the lack of constitutional clarity in this area, there are certain enacted or proposed 
federal tort reform measures that in many respects seem to require the acceptance of some form of 
protective jurisdiction.  I discuss such an example below concerning the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks.  See infra Part II.  Another example going beyond tort reform concerns the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act.  The Court held that jurisdictional grants in that statute created sufficient 
substantive law to warrant federal question jurisdiction.  See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 496-97.  
However, the Court’s holding in that regard has been questioned.  See, e.g., Howard P. Fink, Linda 
S. Mullenix, Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., & Mark V. Tushnet, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 240-41 (2d ed. 2002); Segall, supra note 13, at 379-81. 
 123. Once cases are in the federal system additional measures can be taken as part of a 
“reform” effort.  See Symposium: Multidistrict Litigation and Aggregation Alternatives, 31 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 877-925 (2001).  For example, cases can be shifted within the federal system for 
consolidated handling under the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 
(2000).  And those interested in tort reform have not neglected this aspect of the fight.  There is 
currently pending in Congress the Multidistrict Litigation Restoration Act of 2005 that would, 
among other things, allow cases transferred under Section 1407 to be tried in the transferee district.  
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several years and, one suspects, will remain on the agenda of those 
pursuing tort reform in the immediate future.  And it is a form of tort 
reform that will require the federal courts to deal with important issues 
concerning the potential reach of the federal judicial power.124 
III.  AN EXAMPLE: SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 
Much as with the assassination of President John Kennedy for one 
generation, most Americans remember exactly where they were when 
they learned about the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.  That 
event will likely have legal, political, and social implications for years to 
come.  In this Part I discuss certain federal legislation enacted after the 
September 11th attacks.  This legislation provides a useful example of 
how the varied powers of the federal government that I have discussed 
thus far can be used in conjunction with one another to address a crisis.  
Moreover, this legislation deals directly with the tort system in the 
United States, albeit with respect to a narrow set of claims.  It shows, 
however, how the power of the federal government could be brought to 
bear powerfully on more general “tort reform” issues. 
Only eleven days after the terrorist attacks, Congress passed and 
President Bush signed into law the Air Transportation Safety and 
System Stabilization Act (“ATSSSA”).125  ATSSSA is a remarkable 
statute enacted to address a remarkable event in our Nation’s recent 
history.  A significant part of the statute concerns “stabilizing” the 
 
See H.R. 1038, 109th Cong. (2005).  Under current law, cases must be remanded to the transferor 
court for trial.  See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg, 523 U.S. 26 (1998). 
 124. I would be remiss not to mention abstention here.  Simplistically speaking, the Supreme 
Court has crafted a number of doctrines grouped under the heading “abstention.”  The common 
feature of the doctrines is that under each of them a federal court declines to hear a case over which 
it unquestionably has jurisdiction.  See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 89 at 761-63 (setting 
forth an overview of the doctrine).  The abstention doctrines are controversial for many reasons, 
among which is that they may be seen to unconstitutionally undermine Congressional power over 
the jurisdiction of the federal courts.  Compare Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, 
and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984) (arguing that abstention is 
unconstitutional) with Michael Wells, Why Professor Redish is Wrong About Abstention, 19 GA. L. 
REV. 1097 (1985) (defending the constitutionality of abstention doctrines).  For my purposes here, 
the importance of the abstention doctrines is that the courts will themselves play a potentially 
important role in any jurisdictional tort reform. 
 125. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 
(Sept. 22, 2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (note)).  In November 2001, Congress 
passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act., Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (Nov. 10 
2001).  This statute dealt primarily with additional security measures taken concerning commercial 
aviation in the United States.  See id. at Title I.  Title II of the statute amended the ATSSSA in 
certain respects.  Id. at Title II.  In my discussion I refer to the ATSSSA as it was amended by the 
November 2001, legislation. 
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airline industry through a wide variety of primarily financial means.126  
My focus, however, is on Title IV of ATSSSA dealing with “Victim 
Compensation.”127 
Title IV of the ATSSSA reflects Congress’s use the wide range of 
power available to it under the Constitution, in this case to address the 
potential civil litigation impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.128  First, 
Congress enacted substantive legislation.  Most prominently, it 
established the “September 11th Victim Compensation Fund” (the 
“Fund”) “to provide compensation to any individual (or relatives of a 
deceased individual) who was physically injured or killed as a result of 
the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001.”129  Congress 
directed the Attorney General to appoint a Special Master to administer 
the Fund and to promulgate regulations concerning its operation.130  In 
addition, the Special Master was to determine eligibility for participation 
in the Fund as well as the amount of payments to those deemed 
eligible.131  The Special Master’s determinations were to be immune 
from any judicial review.132  And, significantly, to be eligible for 
 
 126. See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 
230 (Sept. 22, 2001), Title I (“Airline Stabilization”); Title II (“Aviation Insurance”); Title III (“Tax 
Provisions”). 
 127. Id. at Title IV. 
 128. The ATSSA has begun to yield quite interesting academic commentary.  See e.g., Robert 
A. Ackerman, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: A Effective Administrative Response 
to National Tragedy, 10 HARV. NEG. L. REV. 135 (2005); Linda S. Mullenix, The Future of Tort 
Reform: Possible Lessons From the World Trade Center Victim Compensation Fund, 53 EMORY L. 
J. 1315 (2004); Symposium, 36 IND. L. REV. 229-463 (2003); Symposium:  After Disaster:  The 
September 11th Compensation Fund and the Future of Civil Justice, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 205-830 
(2003); Symposium:  War Damage Insurance After Fifty Years, 9 CONN. INS. L. J. 1-210 (2002-
2003). 
 129. ATSSSA, Title IV, sec. 403. 
 130. Id. at § 404.  Attorney General Ashcroft appointed attorney Kenneth Feinberg to serve as 
special master.  See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL ASHCROFT ANNOUNCES THE 
APPOINTMENT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER TO ADMINISTER THE SEPTEMBER 11 VICTIM 
COMPENSATION FUND (Nov. 26, 2001), available at www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/dojpr2. 
pdf.  Whether or not the Fund was “successful” depends almost entirely on one’s definition of that 
often nebulous term.  For present purposes, I merely refer one to the Special Master’s final report 
concerning his administration of the Fund so the reader can make his or her own assessment.  See 
FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER FOR THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND 
OF 2001, available at www.usdoj.gov/final_report.pdf and www.usdoj.gov/final_report_vol2.pdf.  
For a limited perspective from the Special Master himself, see Kenneth Feinberg, The Building 
Blocks of Successful Compensation Programs, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 273 (2005). 
 131. ATSSA, Title IV at § 405. The statute itself provided only broad guidance in this respect.  
Id. at § 404-406. 
 132. Id. at § 405 (b)(3) (“Such a determination [of matters under the Fund] shall be final and 
not subject to judicial review.”).  This clause has not barred all judicial review associated with the 
decisions of the Special Master.  See Schneider v. Feinberg, 345 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2003) (upholding 
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participation in the Fund, a person needed to forgo most claims that 
could have been brought in a civil action.133 
Both the Congressional action creating the Fund and Special Master 
Feinberg’s administration of it raise many issues.134  What is clear 
beyond doubt is that Title IV of the ATSSSA is a powerful example of 
substantive federal legislation dealing with the tort system.  With it, 
Congress took an entire category of cases that could have been made as 
tort claims and provided another avenue by which there could be a 
resolution of potential disputes.  Moreover, it took the unusual step of 
largely agreeing to pay for the resolution of those disputes itself.135  
Thus, through substantive legislation Congress sought to provide 
compensation to victims without requiring potential wrongdoers such as 
the airlines or private security companies to make payments to the 
victims.  This is dramatic tort reform.  There is no substantive reason 
why it could not be adopted in other areas, although the political realities 
might make such action impossible or at least quite difficult.136 
Congress also used the ATSSSA to reach beyond the claims of 
victims and their relatives.  In doing so, Congress may have engaged in 
substantive lawmaking again, but it also used its power to confer 
jurisdiction on the federal courts.  In Section 408 of the statute, as 
amended, Congress purported to create a “Federal cause of action for 
 
the validity of the challenged regulations, interpretative methodologies and policies adopted by 
Special Master Feinberg). 
 133. ATSSSA, Title IV at § 405(c)(3)(B).  Claims against certain collateral source providers as 
well as the terrorist themselves were exempt from this ban on civil litigation.  Id. 
 134. For example, is it fair to have provided victims of this one act of terrorism with benefits 
when victims of other acts of terror did not receive benefits?  Is it appropriate for Congress 
essentially to delegate lawmaking authority to a private individual such as the Special Master?  Is it 
constitutionally permissible to insulate decisions concerning the Fund from all judicial review?  
Were the compensatory damages rules adopted in the statute and by the Special Master consistent 
with the goal of making the victims whole?  Is it appropriate to relieve potentially responsible 
parties such as airlines from liability? These questions, and countless others that could be posed, 
provide fodder for much thought.  See sources cited supra note 128 (discussing many of these 
issues). 
 135. See ATSSSA, Title IV at § 406(b) (“This title constitutes budget authority in advance of 
appropriations Acts and represents the obligation of the Federal Government to provide for the 
payment of amounts for compensation under this title.”). 
 136. An example of how politics can get in the way of substantive reform can be seen in 
connection with the so-called asbestos litigation crisis.  While interpretation of the data varies 
widely, there is little doubt that asbestos litigation has consumed and seems likely to continue to 
consume significant judicial resources in state and federal courts.  See generally STEPHEN J. 
CARROLL, ET AL, ASBESTOS LITIGATION (Rand 2005).  The asbestos problem seemed to call out for 
a federal solution.  And there were and are attempts to do so.  See, e.g., The Fairness in Asbestos 
Injury Resolution Act of 2005, S.852, 109th Cong (2005). Yet, the problem remains as debate and 
political infighting continue. 
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damages arising out of the hijacking and subsequent crashes [of the 
aircraft involved].”137  Such “federal cause of action” was to “be the 
exclusive remedy for damages arising out of the hijacking and 
subsequent crashes of such flights.”138  And Congress further directed 
that all such actions were required to be brought in the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York.139  In sum, using 
many of the techniques I surveyed in Part I, Congress purported to (1) 
establish federal law; (2) create (exclusive) federal jurisdiction; (3) 
expressly preempt state law; and (4) establish exclusive venue in a single 
federal district court. 
As with the creation of the Fund, there are a host of issues that one 
could raise concerning the creation of this “federal cause of action.” The 
federal jurisdiction created was not based on diversity of citizenship, but 
rather on the basis that any claim under the statute would arise under 
federal law.140 Yet, Congress did not really enact substantive federal law 
to govern the “federal cause of action” the ATSSSA was said to create.  
Instead, it directed that “[t]he substantive law for decision in any such 
suit [filed under the ATSSSA] shall be derived from the law, including 
choice of law principles, of the State in which the crash occurred unless 
such law is inconsistent with or preempted by Federal law.”141  Thus, in 
many respects, Congressional power to bestow federal jurisdiction for 
claims that would not be encompassed under diversity jurisdiction raises 
the serious constitutional question I discussed above concerning the limit 
of Congressional power over federal subject matter jurisdiction.142 
There are various ways in which one could address this question.  
First, it could be that the incorporation of state law is sufficient in and of 
itself to create federal law.143 This is even more likely when one 
 
 137. ATSSSA, Title IV at § 408(b)(1). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at § 408(b)(3). 
 140. See supra Part I.D (discussing diversity and federal question jurisdiction). 
 141. ATSSSA, Title IV at § 408(b)(2). 
 142. See supra Part I.D.  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized the potential 
constitutional issues flowing from the creation of this exclusive federal cause of action but has 
disclaimed a need to resolve them.  See The Canada Life Assurance Co. v. Converium 
Ruckverscicherung (Deutschland) A.G., 335 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that Section 408 did 
not encompass claims for economic loss with only a “but for” causal relationship to the events of 
September 11th). 
 143. This was largely the tact taken by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in upholding the 
constitutionality of Congress’s actions in this regard.  See In re: WTC Disaster Case, 414 F.3d 352, 
371-80 (2d Cir. 2005).  The court went on to address the extent to which Congress had sought to 
preempt state tort law, implicating yet another of the tort reform measures I have discussed.  See id; 
see also supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the preemption doctrine). 
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considers that Congress did enact some substantive law by capping the 
damages that certain defendants could face in any civil action that might 
be filed.144  Alternatively, it is possible to view this portion of the 
ATSSSA as a direction to the federal courts to craft federal common law 
with the relevant state law serving merely as a starting point.  Finally, 
and perhaps most intellectually honest and satisfying, the ATSSSA in 
this regard can be seen as a contemporary example of protective 
jurisdiction.145  What is certain is that Congress has used its powers in 
combination in a manner that, at a minimum, pushes the constitutional 
envelope. 146 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The ATSSSA is a prime example of many of the types of federal 
tort reform that are possible.  In turn, a consideration of the broader 
range of possible federal action concerning perceived defects in the tort 
system, tells us a great deal about the kind of governmental structure the 
Framers established in the Constitution.  For example, we see in this area 
that the federal government is one of limited powers; one must be able to 
find some express grant of authority on which to base action.  Once such 
a basis for action has been located, national power is quite strong.  
Congress (or the courts) can in such a situation legislate aggressively, 
even displacing state law in traditionally state-regulated areas.  But the 
national government can also enter the debate in ways far more subtle 
than taking over such a state function.  It can influence matters in a more 
nuanced manner through such means as procedure and jurisdiction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 144. See, e.g., ATSSSA, Title IV at § 408(a) (capping damages for airlines at the amount of 
applicable liability insurance). 
 145. Professor Segall has strongly made this argument.  See Segall, supra note 13, at 388-92. 
 146. I could also have used Congressional legislation passed after the Three Mile Island 
nuclear accident to make a similar point.  In 1988 Congress enacted the Price-Anderson 
Amendments Act of 1988.  See Pub. L. No. 100-408, 102 Stat. 1066 (Aug. 20, 1988).  Among other 
things, that Act purported to create a “federal cause of action” for matters related to the nuclear 
incident.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh).  As with the ATSSSA, Congress did not enact substantive law, 
other than a damages cap.  Instead, it directed the federal courts to apply relevant state law.  Id.  The 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of these provisions, reasoning that 
Congress had legislated substantively.  See In re: TMI Litigation Cases Consolidated II, 940 F.2d 
832, 848-60 (1991). 
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The upshot of this analysis should be a renewed respect for the 
governmental structure created over two-hundred years ago in 
Philadelphia.  One may not always support particular actions of the 
federal government in the realm of “tort reform,” but one may still 
admire the governmental structure under which such actions can be 
taken. 
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